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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the theme of robot rebellion in SF narrative as an incarnation of 
Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic. Chapter one analyzes the depiction of robot rebellion in Karel 
Capek’s R.U.R. Chapter two surveys posthuman theory and offers close readings of two con-
temporary SF television series that exemplify ontologically progressive narratives. The thesis 
concludes that posthuman subjectivity sublates the Master/Slave dialectic and encourages 
practical posthuman ethics.  
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1 Robots and Hegel  
Introduction: Science and Fiction (and Culture) 
          On February 16th, 2011, the IBM supercomputer known as Watson trounced the two most 
accomplished Jeopardy! contestants of all time, successfully completing one of what computer 
scientists refer to as “grand challenges” in cybernetics. During the last round of competition, 
Ken Jennings, anticipating his massive defeat, scribbled the phrase “I for one welcome our new 
robot overlords” beneath his Final Jeopardy response.  The allusion is threefold: it refers to a 
1953 Arthur C. Clark novel, a 1977 film adaptation of an H.G. Wells short story, as well as an ep-
isode of the culturally iconic cartoon The Simpsons.1 With this pop culture quip, Jennings si-
tuated an important scientific moment within the popular Science Fiction (SF) imagination. Fur-
thermore, the three-day televised media spectacle dubbed “Jeopardy! The IBM Challenge” de-
monstrates the inextricable relationship between scientific progress and its representations 
amongst various media platforms, supporting Sheryl Hamilton’s assertion that “media and pop-
ular culture *are+ significant sites for the negotiation of scientific meaning” and that most media 
representations position science as either a source of “wonder” or “fear and horror” (268).  Re-
cognizing the necessity of assuaging any potential unease towards Watson’s abilities, IBM 
created a series of documentary-style interstitials to air throughout the challenge that depict an 
accessible and unthreatening narrative of Watson’s creation. These segments also attempt—or 
at least represent a patronizing attempt—to reduce the knowledge gap between scientific ex-
perts and the broadcast viewers. Despite IBM’s efforts to position cybernetics in a positive light, 
                                                          
1 Childhood’s End, Empire of the Ants, and “Deep Space Homer,” respectively. 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/i-for-one-welcome-our-new-x-overlords 
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the media discourse surrounding Watson’s performance and its significance reflects the cultural 
ambivalence towards technological progress highlighted by Hamilton and exemplifies a rhetori-
cal blending of SF and “real” science. One Youtube clip of a Watson practice round bears the 
tagline “IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Destroys All Humans in Jeopardy,” and numerous news 
headlines and blog posts incorporate the ominous “Man versus Machine” attention-grabbing 
taunt. These representations, sometimes employed for comedic effect, but other times in-
tended as fear-inducing propaganda, all tap into a popular SF consciousness that comprises 
countless narratives about various forms of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (AL). 
Hamilton asserts that “*t+he meanings of science in the early twenty-first century are no longer 
singular or clear, but are being actively produced and reproduced” (277) across media plat-
forms, precipitating an active destabilization of expert knowledge that is linked to an increasing 
conflation of science fact and science fiction. While there are obvious dangers in failing to sepa-
rate the science from the fiction, this cultural conflation also creates an important opportunity 
to engage with SF narrative as a means of thinking through the ethics of an increasingly tech-
nological society.  
The continual blurring between fiction and fact in the world of science means that any 
proper analysis of SF narrative is simultaneously a practice in cultural study. While the topical 
debates pervading SF narrative are numerous and each deserving of careful consideration, one 
of the most prevalent themes, and the one that will dominate the scope of this thesis, is that of 
robot rebellion—the event during which humanity’s technological progeny rise up to annihilate 
their creators. This narrative is quite familiar to anyone remotely acquainted with the SF genre, 
and the figure of the robot is certainly already positioned as nonhuman Other by popular cul-
3 
ture at large (e.g. when someone says “You are acting like a robot,” this signifies a lack of hu-
man emotion/understanding). The recurrent theme of robot rebellion, as popularized via SF 
staple franchises like Terminator and The Matrix, speaks to a pervasive anxiety towards tech-
nological progress—specifically the idea of sentient artificially-constructed beings. The prospect 
of a conscious robot problematizes the fundamentals of human subjectivity by challenging tra-
ditional humanist assumptions concerning personhood. As Myra J. Seaman writes, “The human 
long presumed by traditional Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment humanism is a subject 
(generally assumed male) who is at the center of his world (that is, the world); is defined by his 
supreme, utterly rational intelligence*…+a historically independent agent whose thought and 
action produce history” (246, my emphasis). If robots can think, reason, and feel emotion—the 
humanist anthropocentric cultural paradigm disintegrates, and any attempt to define person-
hood becomes a highly precarious task. Posthumanism, a strand of postmodern theoretical dis-
course, takes up this challenge to reimagine subjectivity and ethics in relation to technology; 
but in order to analyze the stakes of this posthuman brand of consciousness, this thesis will first 
posit that robots—both real and fictive—introduce a new and destabilizing element into the 
historical paradigm of subjective struggle explicated by Hegel in his canonical philosophical 
work, Phenomenology of Spirit. By grounding my argument in part of Hegel’s foundational in-
terrogation of consciousness, I hope to create an onto-epistemological link between Hegel’s 
ideal universal spirit and posthumanism’s hybrid subjectivity.  
 
 
 
4 
SF and Philosophy   
The Master/Slave (or Lord/Bondsman) relationship is one of the most accessible (and 
therefore oft-cited) elements of Hegel's complex dialectical philosophy. For the past two centu-
ries, scholars have used the M/S dialectic to describe and analyze various socio-historical scena-
rios, making the desire for recognition, the willingness to risk death to achieve personhood, and 
the eventual toppling of tyrannical lords relatively basic concepts in academic discourse on so-
cial revolution. Due to the fact that the M/S dialectic was most famously interpreted by Alexan-
dre Kojeve, many 20th-century scholars have appropriated it as a correlative to Marx’s concep-
tion of class struggle. Likewise, the little critical attention that has been paid to the narrative 
theme of robot rebellion has, up until now, been limited to the rather reductive practice of 
mapping Marxist theory onto the narrative, allowing robots to simply stand in as another incar-
nation of the oppressed proletariat.2 While there is certainly adequate visual and thematic evi-
dence in most of these narratives to warrant Marxian readings, I would like to offer a different 
interpretation that understands robots not as symbols for people, but as actual developing sub-
jects. In this thesis, therefore, I return to Hegel’s mythic representation of the M/S encounter as 
an anthropogenetic moment in order to read the theme of robot rebellion not as a literal class 
uprising, but as a metaphorical revolution of consciousness that corresponds to the contempo-
rary ontological project of posthuman theory. 
I will begin my examination of the trope of robot rebellion by analyzing its original narr-
ative precedent, Karel Čapek’s landmark drama R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots) as a philo-
sophical project with significant Hegelian overtones. Then, I will offer detailed readings of two 
                                                          
2 For example, see Kevin Pask’s “Cyborg Economies: Desire and Labor in the Terminator Films.”  
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contemporary televisual narratives—Ron Moore’s Battlestar Galactica (Sci-Fi Channel, 2004-
2009)3 and Joss Whedon’s Dollhouse (FOX, 2008-2009)—in order to explore a potential post-
human solution to the M/S dialectic. Despite historical evidence of the M/S dialectic as an un-
avoidable violent cycle, interpreting Hegel’s work through a posthuman lens suggests that the 
cycle can be broken through a redefinition of subjectivity. Just as Hegel’s Phenomenology 
represents an onto-epistemological project concerning what it means to be conscious of one-
self in relation to others, posthumanism too seeks to redefine personhood in response to the 
disintegration of the cohesive human subject. While the meaning of the term “posthuman” is 
far from fixed in contemporary theoretical discourse—a matter that I will address in the second 
chapter—it is most basically a conceptual lens for reconsidering identity and ethics as they re-
late to new forms of technology and our physical and intellectual interactions with those tech-
nologies. In the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel writes “Spirit is indeed never at rest but 
always engaged in moving forward” (6, my emphasis). Likewise, my understanding of posthu-
man identity as a fluid and dynamic concept will direct notions of subjectivity away from the 
binary opposition of human versus nonhuman (Master versus Slave), towards a sublation of 
Otherness in the form of mutual recognition. Using Hegel’s M/S dialectic as a paradigm for un-
derstanding the struggle for subjective recognition, I will demonstrate how embracing hybrid 
posthuman subjectivity can resolve the dialectic struggle and offer a sublation of the hu-
man/non-human thesis/antithesis. This sublation effectively dissolves hierarchies of difference, 
thus opening a space for paradigmatic ethical revisions. 
                                                          
3 Hereafter referred to as BSG to distinguish it from the original series.  
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The aforementioned assumption that narratives of robot rebellion simultaneously serve 
as cultural metaphors and topical engagements with the reality of cybernetic possibility is es-
sential to my project. Throughout this thesis, I will use the term artificial subjects, as opposed to 
AI or AL, in order to avoid any specific scientific or cultural baggage and to allow for a broad im-
agination of what might constitute artificial subjectivity. Also, my designation of artificial “sub-
jects” automatically presupposes a degree of personhood and rejects the limiting conception of 
AI and AL as merely objects for human use. By aligning key passages of Phenomenology of Spirit 
directly with scenes from R.U.R., I will map the M/S dialectic onto the relationship between 
humans and artificial subjects within SF narrative. My application in this first chapter will dem-
onstrate how the fundamental Hegelian issues at stake inform a perpetual ontological project 
that also comprises the basis of posthumanism. Artificial subjects—whether narratively im-
agined or technologically real—change the way that consciousness and subjectivity must be 
conceived.  
The second chapter of this thesis will address posthuman theory as a reconfiguration of 
subjectivity that opens up an egalitarian ethics by encouraging a symbiotic relationship be-
tween humans and technology. I will survey a variety of posthuman scholarship that confronts 
artificial subjectivity in specific ways, thus building a platform from which to launch my textual 
analysis of BSG and Dollhouse. Both of these series invoke the theme of robot rebellion in 
unique ways that depart from the standard cultural representation of the human/robot rela-
tionship. The goal of this analysis will be to demonstrate that contemporary SF narratives, pro-
duced within the undercurrent of posthuman theory, can offer valuable conceptual and theo-
retical solutions to the sociocultural dogmatism that is rooted in an anthropocentric human-
7 
ist/Enlightenment worldview. Furthermore, the posthuman resolutions of these televisual narr-
atives each offer a sublation of Otherness by positing hybridity as an entry point for the kind of 
mutual recognition necessary to overcome the M/S dilemma. This posthuman sublation will 
represent the conclusion of my project and provide a framework for interpreting other ontolog-
ically progressive narratives.  
 
The Robot’s (Hegelian) Rebellion  
As any scholar of Hegel knows, there exists an overwhelming saturation of critical work 
on the M/S dialectic: therefore, I do not seek to provide any kind of radical reinterpretation of 
this portion of Hegel's philosophy. Rather, I hope that in providing a unique application of the 
concept, I might be able to arrive at new conclusions concerning consciousness and subjectivi-
ty—ones that certainly could never have been anticipated by Hegel himself and ones that con-
tribute more to our proactive understanding of posthumanism than a retroactive understand-
ing of Hegelianism. The goal of the following invocation of Phenomenology of Spirit is then to 
establish the framework of my argument and to resist the relatively static interpretations of the 
M/S dialectic that persist in contemporary discourse. While the tendency of scholars is to trans-
late Hegel’s Phenomenology as a definitive system,4 Hegel’s writing consistently emphasizes 
perpetual movement and contextual change—“life as a living thing” (107, emphasis in original). 
This ontological fluidity primes Hegel’s philosophy for my posthuman position that artificial sub-
jectivity sublates the M/S thesis/antithesis model. Frederic Jameson similarly privileges the 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Phillip Kain’s Hegel and the Other (2005), Peter Simpon’s Hegel’s Transcendental In-
duction (1998), and Robert R. Williams’ “The Concept of Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(2003).  
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fluidity of Hegel’s philosophy in his 2010 book-length study The Hegel Variations, beginning his 
argument with the recognition that there is a “renewed appeal of Hegel’s work and *a+ revival 
of interest in it, in a postmodernity characterized by cynical reason.” He goes on to assert that 
“*w+e must *...+ rescue the Phenomenology from its stereotypical reading as an out-of-date 
teleology” (4). Since Jameson is one of the quintessential figures of postmodern theory, his 
analysis of the M/S dialectic helps to validate my own appropriation of Hegel and form a bridge 
between my Hegelian and posthuman projects.  
In the “Self-Consciousness” section of the Phenomenology, Hegel summarizes the moti-
vation behind the M/S dialectic as follows: 
 [T]he relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove  
  themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must   
  engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for   
  themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case.   
  And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won [...] The indi-  
  vidual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but   
  he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent   
  self-consciousness (114, emphasis in original). 
This dense but crucial passage introduces several key components of the M/S dialectic: the 
need for external recognition of self, the necessity of the life-and-death confrontation in order 
to obtain that recognition, and the incomplete personhood that results from an unwillingness 
to engage in that struggle and accept the slave position. While I will eventually use posthuman-
ism to subvert each of these elements of the dialectic, let us take them as the given paradigm 
9 
for now and look at how this scenario can be applied to robot rebellion as it has been repro-
duced in narratives: humans create robots for the purpose of enslavement (specifically to in-
crease the ease of human daily life). From the outset, in order to justify this enslavement, hu-
mans must view their creations as completely nonhuman/subaltern/Other. As technological 
capability increases, scientists attempt to make their robots as “life-like” as possible, resulting 
in various forms of Strong AI, and then eventually the android figure (or the robot that is physi-
cally indistinguishable from a human).5 Upon coming into consciousness via the revelation of 
their autonomous power, robots then seek to overcome their slave status by engaging in a bat-
tle for recognition with their human masters. This confrontation (the robot rebellion) results in 
what I and some other scholars refer to as the “techno-apocalypse”: the destruction (or near 
destruction) of civilization as we know it by means of our technological creations. Just as the 
Hegelian life-and-death struggle cannot end in literal death, but only subjective death in the 
form of submission, the techno-apocalypse must leave some number of human survivors in or-
der that the triumphant robots have someone around to recognize them as the new masters. In 
this dialectical reversal, however, robots—with the realization of their mental and physical su-
periority—now view humans as subaltern, incomplete subjects who are unworthy of recogni-
tion. Meanwhile, humans, being the resilient persons that they are, now must engage in their 
own struggle for recognition, fighting back against their robotic despots, and the cycle contin-
ues. In most narrative incarnations of this dialectic pattern, the two sides simply jostle for the 
position of dominance until that particular story comes to some kind of conclusion—one that is 
                                                          
5 The android is the endgame in the production of artificial subjects, and so I will be looking particularly 
at narrative representations of androids in this study, but it should be understood that all incarnations 
of robots affect our cultural understanding of artificial subjectivity and thus play a role in my general 
argument. 
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almost always marked by what Neil Badmington refers to as residual “traces of humanism” 
(“Theorizing” 12). In other words, the human “heroes” kill the “evil” robots and then start re-
building the world based on the same anthropocentric values that started this dialectical mess 
in the first place.  
The above application of Hegel provides a general framework for mapping the M/S di-
alectic onto popular narratives of robot rebellion, but in order to examine this relationship 
more closely, I turn to Čapek and his astonishingly prescient stage play R.U.R. Originally con-
ceived in 1921 as “a comedy, partly of science, partly of truth” (Čapek, qtd. in Harkins 91), 
R.U.R. proves that as long as there have been “robots,” there has always been the robot's rebel-
lion. In fact, Čapek's brother actually invented the word, which resembles the Czech word for 
“servitude” (Roberts 168). The play tells the story of a robot manufacturing company that mass-
produces artificial beings (of the android variety) and ships them all over the world to perform 
various kinds of work for humans. Eventually, however, the global robot population forms a 
movement to annihilate the humans and claim the world for themselves. Unfortunately, by kill-
ing their former Masters, the robots also lose their ability to procreate (since they possess no 
sex organs). Therefore, their temporary claim to Mastery is severely undermined by their in-
evitable extinction. While R.U.R. enjoyed positive popular reception in the wake of its release, 
the ingenuity of this play has been culturally overshadowed by Fritz Lang's groundbreaking film 
Metropolis (1927), which premiered four years after the American stage debut of R.U.R.6 Re-
cent SF scholarship tends to at least make a nod to Čapek's contribution to the genre, but there 
exists a general dearth of critical engagement with the play itself. While my work here will not 
                                                          
6 I speculate that the explosive popularity of the film industry and the visual ingenuity of Lang’s produc-
tion are likely responsible for this phenomenon.  
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succeed in completely rectifying this oversight, I hope that casting a contemporary (and specifi-
cally posthuman) theoretical eye on R.U.R. will demonstrate the importance of Čapek's work 
and the applicability of his themes to more recent narratives and discourses concerning the 
ethics of artificial subjectivity.  
The prologue of R.U.R. is primarily a moral debate between Domin, the appropriately-
named president of the robot manufacturing company, and Helena, the liberal-minded crusad-
er for “robot rights” who comes to the isolated island where the manufacturing takes place in 
order to “incite the robots” (17) to rebellion. In his attempt to prove to Helena that the robots 
do not need or desire any form of civil rights, Domin begins by explaining the rationale behind 
their creation:  
 Young Rossum successfully invented a worker with the smallest number   
  of needs, but to do so he had to simplify him. He chucked everything not   
  directly related to work, and in so doing he pretty much discarded the   
  human being and created the Robot [...] Robots are not people. They are   
  mechanically more perfect than we are, they have an astounding intellect- 
  tual capacity, but they have no soul. (9) 
From the beginning, then, the impetus for creating robots is enslavement through labor. Also 
from the beginning, Domin positions the robots as soulless and inhuman. Dominant political 
and social groups throughout history have always employed a similar rhetoric in the process of 
enslaving other humans (or animals, for that matter), but this justification seems more easily 
acceptable when applied to robots—we create them (not god), therefore we have the right to 
control them. Indeed, Čapek utilizes “the soul” throughout the play as an abstraction of the es-
12 
sence of humanity and morality, a trend that is still prevalent in contemporary SF. This need to 
locate an exclusively human essence is undermined by Hegel’s own definition of the concept: 
“Essence is infinity as the supercession of all distinctions, the pure movement of axial rotation” 
(106, emphasis in original). In other words, essence is neither fixed nor exclusive to any particu-
lar concept of itself. As Jameson writes, “The Master/Slave dialectic is then to be grasped as a 
play of essential and inessential, which is however already a unity of opposites” (92, my empha-
sis). Here, Jameson’s assertion of the inherent/inevitable collapse of perceived difference antic-
ipates my own sublation of the M/S dialectic via posthumanism. Čapek plays on the ambiguity 
of human essence in the Prologue, when Domin confuses Helena by neglecting to tell her that 
his secretary is a robot and then allowing her to suppose that his board of directors are also ro-
bots. This confusion results in a comedic exchange that exposes the difficulty of recognizing 
“human essence” when robots and humans are physically indistinguishable.  
Čapek hints at the inevitable loss of control (Mastery) over technological creation in the 
Prologue, when Dr. Hallemeier admits to Helena that “*o+ccasionally they *the robots+ go crazy 
somehow [...] We call it Robotic Palsy. All of a sudden one of them goes and breaks whatever it 
has in its hand, stops working, gnashes its teeth *...+ Evidently a breakdown of the organism” 
(19). Helena insists that this “Robotic Palsy” is evidence that the robots possess souls, but the 
Rossum directors dismiss her suggestion as naïve and laughable. Domin then goes on to outline 
what he sees as the purpose and eventual telos of robot labor, claiming, “Yes, people will be 
out of work, but by then there’ll be no work left to be done. Everything will be done by living 
machines. People will only do what they enjoy. They will live only to perfect themselves” (21). 
Čapek juxtaposes Domin’s utopian vision with that of Alquist, the builder, who reminds the 
13 
company’s president, “there was some kind of virtue in work and fatigue” (21). Alquist’s state-
ment here foreshadows the Hegelian motion of the rest of the play, positioning labor as an es-
sential component of full subjectivity and thus predicting the eventual mastery of the robots. As 
Hegel posits: 
 The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile   
  consciousness of the bondman...But just as lordship showed that its es-  
  sential nature is the reverse of what is wants to be, so too servitude in its  
  consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is;  
  as consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be  
  transformed into a truly independent consciousness. (117) 
Hegel’s supposition that true consciousness can only be achieved by means of enduring bon-
dage and transforming oneself through work is essential for understanding the rest of the play. 
Jameson suggests that for Hegel (as opposed to Marx), “*T+he ethos of work […] can be said to 
be metaphysical rather than historical, in the sense in which it registers what seem to be philo-
sophical -isms and worldviews, rather than conjunctures and situations" (68). Hegel’s positive 
positioning of servitude therefore supports my interpretation of Rossum’s robots not as a de-
humanized proletariat, but instead as newly constituted subjects who achieve a form of anth-
ropogenesis as a consequence of forced labor.  
After the Prologue characterized by a tension between Domin’s grand social promises 
and Helena and Alquist’s ethical concerns, Act One of R.U.R. jumps ten years into the future. 
Helena is now married to Domin and adored by the rest of the directors, who all attempt to 
shield her from the reality that Rossum has lost control of its creations. Helena finds a newspa-
14 
per and learns that not only have the robots unionized, but human women all over the world 
have stopped bearing children. When she asks Alquist to explain the sudden global infertility, 
he tells her, “Because human labor has become unnecessary, because suffering has become 
unnecessary, because man needs nothing, nothing, nothing” (35). Here, Alquist suggests that all 
of humanity has assumed the Hegelian position of idle lords (both physically and ontologically): 
their infertility is a metaphor for their lack of manual productivity.7  
Before the global robot rebellion induces the first narrative techno-apocalypse, Čapek 
represents the struggle for Hegelian recognition on a smaller scale via an interaction between 
Helena and Radius, a newly self-aware robot. Radius tells Helena, “I will not work for you [...] 
you are not like robots. You are not as capable as Robots are. Robots do everything. You only 
give orders—utter empty words.” He then goes on to say, “I do not want a master. I know eve-
rything *....+ I want to be the master of others” (37). Helena, desperately searching for common 
ground, tells Radius that he could be “in charge of many Robots,” but he replies, “I want to be 
the master of people” (37, my emphasis). Horrified, Helena suggests that Radius has gone mad, 
and he responds with the ultimate Hegelian self-sacrificial gesture: “You can send me to the 
stamping-mill” (37).8 This brief but crucial scene demonstrates the three key motivations of the 
M/S dialectic. First, Radius expresses the laborer's realization of the extent of his power 
through his work. Second, he asserts his desire to be recognized as a Master. Third, he is willing 
to risk his own life for the principle of full recognition. Radius's process of becoming thus mir-
rors Hegel's assertion that “the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he 
                                                          
7 Hegel: “What now really confronts *the lord+ is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent 
one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-itself as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in 
reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action” (117, emphasis in original).  
8 The “stamping mill” is the place where “malfunctioning robots” are destroyed (i.e. killed). 
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seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own” (119, my em-
phasis). So, while the humans’ Mastery confines them to the Hegelian position of idle lords, 
Rossum’s robots enjoy the role of the bondsmen full of potential to self-actualize through their 
labor.  
Just as Alquist’s plea to Domin in the Prologue about the value of work foreshadows the 
techno-apocalyptic events of the rest of the play, Jameson asserts that “the Master *...+ is al-
ways secretly menaced by his own deeper inessentiality and by the essential work, fear, and 
production of the Slave” (92). Jameson also argues that the Master not only worries about the 
Slave during his reign of power, but that “the recognition of the Slave as an existence and a 
danger [...] precedes the consciousness of the Master as an organized ideology” (91, my em-
phasis). Thus, the precarious, unstable nature of the M/S relationship is inherent even before 
its inception, a point that Čapek highlights through the temporal juxtaposition of the Prologue 
and Act One. Jameson’s supposition also helps to explain current cultural anxieties about ro-
bots: as we enslave them (which we are clearly beginning to do), we can already anticipate 
their rebellion. This fear of inevitable loss of human Mastery is a result of the ontological inse-
curities described above, but it is further perpetuated by the abundance of cultural narratives 
that demonstrate the event of robot rebellion. 
The board of directors soon learns that the unionized robots have decided to extermi-
nate all humans and claim their status as rightful masters of the world. After weeks of isolation 
on the production island with no incoming boat traffic, a mail ship arrives carrying only pamph-
lets bearing the following message, which Domin relates to the group: 
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 ‘Robots of the world! We, the first union of Rossums Universal Robots,   
  declare man our enemy and outcasts in the universe’ *...+ They go on to   
  assert that they are higher than man on the evolutionary scale. That they   
  are stronger and more intelligent. That man lives off them like a parasite   
  *...+’Robots of the world, you are ordered to exterminate the human race.  
  Do not spare the men. Do not spare the women [...] To be carried out   
  immediately upon receipt of these orders.’ (47-48)   
The content of the pamphlet’s message closely resembles Radius’s rhetoric during his interac-
tion with Helena a few pages earlier. The pamphlet further invokes Hegelian M/S dialectical 
components by incorporating a reversal of the human’s earlier rhetoric: the robots now expli-
citly claim the human as the subaltern Other (“outcast”). The fact that Domin only glosses cer-
tain sections of the pamphlet indicates not only his obvious unwillingness to accept the robots’ 
argument, but also suggests an implicit capitulation that corroborates Jameson’s supposition of 
the Master’s preexisting knowledge of his own eventual defeat. Immediately after discovering 
the pamphlets, Act One concludes when the factory whistle blows at an unscheduled mo-
ment—“The signal to attack” (49), Domin surmises. Thus begins the first robot rebellion and the 
first techno-apocalypse in SF narrative. Of course, like all such narratives to follow, the remain-
ing humans do not give up without a fight. 
Act Two, which ostensibly represents the last stand of human civilization, also serves as 
Čapek’s engagement with the human reaction to the usurpation of their role as Masters. Whe-
reas more recent examples of robot rebellion focus heavily on the physical battle (violence 
sells, after all), R.U.R. presents a philosophical struggle to understand the cause of the techno-
17 
apocalypse. As the various members of the board point fingers in different directions, Alquist 
sums up their ruminations:  
 I blame science! I blame technology! Domin! Myself! All of us! We, we   
  are at fault! For the sake of our megalomania, for the sake of somebody’s  
  profits, for the sake of progress, I don’t know, for the sake of some tre-  
  mendous something we have murdered humanity! So now you can crash   
  under the weight of all your greatness! No Genghis Khan has ever erected  
  such an enormous tomb from human bones. (56) 
Alquist’s outburst here sets the narrative precedent for the realization of human vanity as the 
impetus for the destruction of civilization. This passage suggests that through the quest for 
power and Mastery, humans bring about their own destruction. At this point, the Hegelian logic 
upon which I have been relying must take its first explicitly posthuman turn. Until now, the M/S 
dialectic has only been mapped on to human/human relationships, even if one group rhetori-
cally receives a “nonhuman” status.9 When translated into a human/artificial subject scenario, 
the M/S dialectic no longer functions only as a way to interpret the interactions of various so-
cio-historical groups, but it becomes a means of analyzing the fundamentals of subjectivity as 
they might apply to nonbiological persons. So, when Alquist alludes to Genghis Khan in the 
above passage, suggesting that his tyrannical destruction was nothing compared to the effects 
of the Rossum project, he thus sets the techno-apocalyptic scenario apart from all other histori-
cal examples. Jameson, though not speaking in terms of artificial subjectivity, does suggest that 
the M/S dialectic may have new kinds of applications, writing, “In the case of contemporary or 
                                                          
9 See Sybol Anderson, Hegel’s Theory of Recognition: From Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity 
(2009) for a thorough application of Hegel to various social and political situations.  
18 
postmodern identity politics, recognition secures the access of the hitherto victimized or op-
pressed group to the acknowledged status of a new player within an ongoing social system” 
(90). Jameson’s emphasis on the mutability of social hierarchies and the way that such changes 
also affect paths to recognition supports my own interpretation of the M/S dialectic in its po-
tentially posthuman form. If social systems are constantly in flux, then so are our conceptions of 
subjectivity and the corresponding ethics of recognition.  
Čapek returns to the concept of the soul in Act Two in order to offer an explanation for 
the robot rebellion, while again abstractly conceptualizing the essence of humanity. Helena 
admits to the group that she begged Dr. Gall to “give the Robots souls” (57). She tells Domin, “I 
thought that...if they were like us they would understand us and they wouldn’t hate us so---if 
they were only a little bit human!” (58). Domin responds, “No one can hate more than man 
hates man! Transform stones into people and they’ll stone us!” (58). Domin’s observation fits 
neatly into the Hegelian assumption that part of the motivation behind the M/S confrontation 
lies in the initial process of self-formation. Hegel writes that when “*s+elf-consciousness is faced 
by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it 
has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superceded the 
other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self” 
(111). This process seems to be precisely what happens to Rossum’s robots: when they become 
“more like people” (38), they concordantly seek to distinguish themselves from the external 
and position the Other (in this case, humans) as inessential. Like humans, these soul-bearing 
and thus self-conscious robots react to their Slave status as any potential Hegelian subject vying 
for recognition will—by overthrowing their Masters. The rest of Act Two consists of the charac-
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ters scrambling for some mode of defense against the robots, while only Alquist resigns himself 
to death. Unfortunately for him, after the robots kill Helena, Domin, and the rest of the board 
of directors, Radius orders the other robots to spare Alquist, who then assumes the role of the 
necessary survivor, relegated to the position of Slave for his robot Masters.  
Act Three focuses on Alquist’s ontological struggle to bear the burden of humanity’s 
mistakes while also attempting to understand the subjectivity of the robots. Meanwhile, the 
robots have realized that they cannot reproduce without Rossum’s formula for production, 
which Helena impulsively burned in Act Two after learning about the global infertility. At the 
beginning of Act Three, the robot leader, Damon, pleads with Alquist to help them recreate the 
formula. Alquist insists that “only people can procreate, renew life, restore everything that was” 
(74, my emphasis) and blames the robots for destroying all humans. In a chorus of responses, 
the robots tell Alquist, “We wanted to become people [...] We wanted to live. We are more ca-
pable. We have learned everything. We can do everything [...] You gave us weapons. We had to 
become masters” (74, my emphasis). This theme of the militarization of technology is worth 
pausing on for a moment, as it will reappear later in my discussions of BSG and Dollhouse. In 
Wired for War, P.W. Singer, a security analyst, invokes SF narratives to address real robotics is-
sues in contemporary warfare. He points out the consistent historical overlap of scientific fic-
tion and fact, calls for an ethical understanding of potential artificial subjects, but ultimately 
worries that the human obsession with violence and war will preclude any utopian technologi-
cal visions. He concludes his massive study by praising human scientific accomplishment and 
hailing robots as our next great creation, but he adds that “this revolution is mainly driven by 
our inability to move beyond the conflicts that have shaped human history from the very start. 
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Sadly, our machines may not be the only thing wired for war” (436). By suggesting that it is the 
violent nature of humans that makes the robot rebellion inevitable, Singer implicitly recognizes 
that an ethical approach to technology is necessary in order to prevent an eventual techno-
apocalyptic confrontation.   
Just as Singer posits war as inherent to human civilization, Damon likewise points out to 
Alquist: “You have to kill and rule if you want to be like people. Read history! Read people’s 
books! You have to conquer and murder if you want to be people!” (74). Damon’s observation 
supports the assumption that I made in the introduction that violence, particularly as a result of 
the M/S dynamic, seems inherent and inevitable in our socio-historical structure. Alquist, still 
clinging desperately to his humanist ideals, refuses to recognize the robots as persons, main-
taining that “*r+obots are not life. Robots are machines” (75). One of the robots responds, “We 
were machines, sir, but from horror and suffering we’ve become *...+ We’ve become beings 
with souls” (75). Alquist does not believe this claim until he witnesses one of the robots willing 
to sacrifice his life for a female robot—presumably because he does not want to live without 
her. Alquist interprets this gesture as one of true love, and he encourages the robots to leave 
the factory, telling them, “Go, Adam. Go, Eve” (84). Alquist then proceeds to recite verses from 
Genesis, and the play thus ends on a rather trite humanist note, privileging human love as the 
essence of life and avoiding the more complex questions of subjectivity raised by robot con-
sciousness. Čapek, like the many authors and screenwriters that will follow in his footsteps, 
lacks access or insight into a more satisfying means of concluding the techno-apocalyptic narra-
tive. Alquist’s final soliloquy demonstrates an overblown religious awe that seems incongruous 
with the secular tone of the rest of the play. Based on absolutely no evidence, Alquist believes 
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that the love displayed by the two robots means they will be able to reproduce and therefore 
pass on some kind of human spark. The fact that Alquist is fairly mentally deranged at this 
point, however, suggests that his elevation of the robots’ love is likely a desperate delusion. The 
conclusion of R.U.R., therefore, in which only one human remains and the robots are (in all like-
lihood) doomed to extinction, demonstrates the potentially apocalyptic telos of the M/S dialec-
tic.  
 
R.U.R.’s Aftermath: Setting the Stage for Robot Rebellions to Follow  
Of course, Čapek could never have anticipated that his narrative creations would not on-
ly become thematic staples of the SF genre throughout the rest of the century (and continuing 
today), but also that his depiction of robots would so closely mirror scientific reality of the 21st 
century. Likewise, Hegel’s philosophical project had no need to account for potential artificial 
subjects, and thus reflects an inherent strain of humanism while still allowing for posthuman 
interpretations. Contemporary scholars have barely scratched the surface of possible ways to 
use Hegel in the debate over machine consciousness. One of the few applicable studies, Win-
field’s Hegel and Mind (2010) presumes to use Hegel to reconfigure philosophy of mind in rela-
tionship to artificial subjectivity, but he ultimately remains in a conservative ontological space. 
Winfield argues that “intrinsic connection is precisely what eludes the mechanical process of 
inputs by thinking machines [...] As a consequence, none of the reflexivity constitutive of mind 
can possibly be attributed to machines. For this reason, no machine will ever feel, be conscious, 
or have desires and emotions” (58). Here, Winfield advocates a thoroughly anthropocentric 
conception of mind that seems to ignore the fluidity and flexibility of Hegel’s depiction of con-
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sciousness. After all, Hegel writes that “*t+he realized purpose, or the existent actuality, is 
movement and unfolded becoming; but it is just this unrest that is the self” (12, my emphasis). 
In other words, “unrest” is not only an aspect of subjectivity, but in fact the essence of it. Win-
field also ignores the fact that cybernetic models and artificial subjects are in a constant state of 
evolution and flux as a result of rapid technological advancements: rather than using scientific 
possibility as an entry point for understanding consciousness, he dismisses artificial subjectivity 
altogether. He commits to a binary conception of mind function, asserting the “’external’ tele-
ology of artifacts” in opposition to the “’internal’ teleology of living things” (50). Winfield’s bi-
furcation of internal and external seems counterintuitive to Hegel’s own invocation of this di-
chotomous relationship.10 I bring Winfield into the discussion here (despite the fact that his in-
terpretation of mind differs so vastly from my own) in order to demonstrate the lack of pro-
gressive Hegelian scholarship taking place on the contemporary theoretical scene and thus to 
set my own interpretations apart from this conservative appropriation of Hegel, particularly 
within the discourse concerning artificial subjectivity.  
The only study of R.U.R. that comes close to recognizing the philosophical implications 
of Čapek’s text is Kamila Kinyon’s 1999 article in Science Fiction Studies. Despite Kinyon’s con-
clusively reductive understanding of the play as being more about confrontations with death 
than the formation of subjectivity, she does at least see the need to understand R.U.R. “as a 
carefully constructed philosophical reflection on major epistemological and ethical issues” 
(379). Kinyon, though invoking Hegel throughout her study, aligns her argument more closely 
with the notion of the Kantian categorical imperative that “duty should be followed as a formal 
                                                          
10 Hegel: “*I+t  is for consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the being of the object for an oth-
er, are one and the same” (104).  
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principle, for the pure sake of duty itself rather than for a concrete purpose” (380). In order to 
make her argument conform to her Kantian agenda, Kinyon conveniently ignores certain as-
pects of the play, leading to an ultimately flawed interpretation of Čapek’s message. Kinyon 
takes the religious conclusion of the play at face value, arguing that in his final monologue, “Al-
quist recites the Biblical text as a way of regaining faith” (396). As I have already suggested, I 
see the final lines as undeniably ironic, since the robotic “Adam and Eve” are still sterile ma-
chines incapable of biological reproduction. Kinyon does admit that the end of the play “indi-
cates that there is no easy escape from the lordship and bondage relation” (396), but she fails 
(or refuses) to engage with the implications of this narrative (and philosophical) ambiguity.  
In “R.U.R. Restored and Reconsidered,” Merritt Abrash begins with the promising asser-
tion that the play “has become a kind of historical artifact, treated with unfailing respect but 
not as a work of contemporary viability” (184). Unfortunately, Abrash’s only imagined solution 
to this oversight is to scrutinize the discrepancies amongst the various English translations of 
the play, with a particular emphasis on the Novack version first released in 1990. Abrash’s ulti-
mate thesis, derived from one vague line in a Čapek interview, is that “the play’s true concern is 
with the nature of not robots, but of humans” (190). He goes on to conclude that “while in the 
history of science fiction the appearance of R.U.R. was a major event, the play is not a major 
work of science fiction thought” (191). This seems to me to be a rather counterproductive dis-
tinction to emphasize, especially considering the effect that R.U.R. clearly has on countless 
narratives that follow it. In my opinion, Čapek’s ignorance of his own prescience (i.e. his inabili-
ty to predict that humans would create artificial subjects that closely resemble his fictive ro-
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bots) is irrelevant when considering the play in the broader context of the SF genre and the 
popular cultural imagination. 
Čapek’s narrative precedent for robot rebellion, along with its problematic and unsatis-
fying conclusion, has been continually recycled throughout some of popular culture’s most re-
cognizable SF narratives. The prevalence of the robot rebellion trope fuels cultural anxieties 
about technological progress, reinforces the human/nonhuman binary, and promotes a simplis-
tic humanist telos that struggles to move beyond the simple “love conquers all” solution to 
which Čapek reluctantly resorts in R.U.R. Robert Geraci writes of 20th century SF, “Technology 
promises salvation on the one hand while threatening damnation with the other. This coinci-
dence of opposites appears most prominently in depictions of intelligent robots” (967). The cul-
tural pervasiveness of the robot as ambiguous Other can be deconstructed systematically 
through an engagement with posthuman theory and progressive SF narratives that look to hy-
brid notions of subjectivity as a means of negotiating ontology in a historical moment characte-
rized by rapid technological change.  
Neil Badmington begins his introduction to Posthumanism (2000) by analyzing a cultural 
moment that changed the way humans thought about technology: Time magazine’s 1982 deci-
sion to bestow its “Person of the Year” award to “The Computer.” Badmington invokes this 
moment in order to illustrate the astonishing speed with which technology both infiltrates our 
lives and shapes our conceptions of subjectivity. To update this anecdote, during the same 
week that Watson made his Jeopardy! debut, Time magazine’s cover featured a pale, shaved 
human head with a computer wire and bright green light protruding at the base of the neck: 
“2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal.” The image and caption correspond to the feature 
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article on Ray Kurzweil and the Singularity Movement, in which Lev Grossman offers a detailed 
account of the growing futurist conception that computer intelligence will inevitably surpass 
that of humans and change civilization as we know it. Kurzweil suggests that "[H]uman progress 
is exponential [...] rather than linear [...] [and that] exponential growth is seductive, starting out 
slowly and virtually unnoticeably, but beyond the knee of the curve it turns explosive and pro-
foundly transformative" (Kurzweil 10). Hegel also imagines such “singular” moments in history: 
“The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of 
something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that 
left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates 
the features of the new world” (7). These two passages encourage an understanding of histori-
cal change as nonlinear and often marked by important (and sometimes unexpected) moments 
that force paradigmatic shifts in the way that we conceive of the world. Both the recent Time 
magazine article and Watson’s victory on Jeopardy! contribute to a rapidly expanding discourse 
informed simultaneously by technological reality (via the scientific community) and representa-
tions of technological possibility (via popular culture). Posthumanism draws on this relationship 
between science fact and fiction as a way of comprehensively understanding change and reac-
tion to change. In the next chapter, I will outline some of the most useful posthuman theoreti-
cal scholarship for addressing artificial subjectivity before analyzing BSG and Dollhouse as narra-
tives that encourage a progressive conception of ontology in response to humanity’s increasing 
dependence upon and integration with technology.   
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2 Posthuman Television 
Posthumanism and Artificial Subjectivity  
  As I suggested in the introduction, the definition of posthumanism is by no means fixed, 
but instead highly contested within contemporary theoretical discourse. Like other “-isms,” a 
great deal of scholarship in the field deals primarily in attempts to describe, inscribe, and pre-
scribe the tenets of posthumanism. The varied and disparate accounts of posthumanism and its 
theoretical project make any singular interpretation of the subject impossible. Therefore, what I 
present here as the fundamental framework of posthuman theory is the result of my own fo-
rays into the abundant discourse and a deliberate assembly of what I deem the most engaging 
and fruitful contributions to the discussion. I will also direct my understanding of posthuman-
ism specifically to the issues surrounding artificial subjectivity, although I hope to demonstrate 
that the flexibility of this theoretical lens is a useful address to a variety of ontological and epis-
temological questions. For the purposes of this thesis, the most fundamental posthuman theme 
is destabilization of identity, a process that Badmington and others argue has been occurring 
incrementally since the height of humanist philosophy during the Enlightenment. Heliocen-
trism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian psychoanalysis all represent significant signposts on 
the path to posthumanity. I argue that artificial subjectivity is the next major destabilizing 
event: while I do believe (like Hayles and many others) that we are already posthuman but 
simply have failed to recognize and embrace it on a grand cultural scale, I posit that the advent 
of advanced artificial subjects will cause a tear in the fabric of humanism that will be impossible 
to ignore.  
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Although some scholarship laments the elusiveness of a monolithic, capital “P” posthu-
manism, I see the field’s interdisciplinary fluidity as essential for confronting our rapidly chang-
ing position as postmodern, postindustrial, postsecular subjects. Since all “post-” “-isms” are 
inevitably linked to and interacting with their prefixless counterparts, a brief definition of hu-
manism then serves as a logical starting point here. It is quite telling that Badmington, through-
out all of his attempts at “Approaching,” “Theorizing,” and “Mapping” posthumanism,11 cleverly 
evades defining it outright. Yet, he feels quite comfortable defining his subject’s precursor and 
source, offering this succinct account: 
 As I understand it, humanism is a discourse which claims that the figure   
  of ‘Man’ (sic) naturally stands at the centre of things; is entirely distinct   
  from animals, machines, and other nonhuman entities; is absolutely   
  known and knowable to `himself'; is the origin of meaning and history;   
  and shares with all other human beings a universal essence. Its absolutist  
  assumptions, moreover, mean that anthropocentric discourse relies upon  
  a set of binary oppositions, such as human/inhuman, self/other, natu-  
  ral/cultural, inside/outside, subject/object, us/them, here/there, ac  
  tive/passive, and wild/tame. (“Mapping” 1345) 
Allow me to add “Master/Slave” to that list of binaries. To extrapolate, the posthumanist 
project thus begins with a resistance to essentialism, absolutism, anthropocentrism, and binary 
logic—posthumanism is the fundamental decentering of the human(ist) subject. Perhaps the 
reason why Badmington finds it easier to define humanism than its “post-” lies in the fact that 
                                                          
11 Badmington: “Introduction: Approaching Posthumanism” (2000), “Theorizing Posthumanism” (2003), 
and “Mapping Posthumanism” (2004).  
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humanism has acquired an ideological status: even as it emerges in various incarnations 
throughout history, a humanist framework encapsulates centuries of dominant worldviews. 
Likewise, even as posthumanism is responding to and interacting with that ideology, it aspires 
(in its most effective forms) to resist definition and thus association with a particular doctrine. 
Rather, if posthumanism can be used as a discursive frame that begins with some basic anti-
humanist (and anti-anthropocentric) assumptions, definitions proliferate and allow for a pro-
ductive, interdisciplinary, and pluralistic discourse.  
As I began to address in the first chapter, SF narratives—particularly those dealing with 
artificial subjectivity—often work against the humanist conceptions outlined by Badmington in 
the above passage to form posthuman representations of the social order. In fact, many scho-
lars of posthumanism turn to SF narrative as a vehicle for addressing the ontological and epis-
temological questions raised by the demise of the human subject. Hayles’ work in particular 
lays the groundwork for blending discussions of cybernetic reality and its narrative counterparts 
to focus on the specific implications of thinking machines and disembodied consciousness. The 
interdisciplinarity of her work is evidenced by the title of her seminal and ubiquitously cited 
book, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics 
(1999), in which Hayles describes “the posthuman view” using four elements: 
 First, [it] privileges informational pattern over material instantiation *….+   
  Second, [it] considers consciousness *…+ as an epiphenomenon *…+Third,   
  [it] thinks of the body as the original prosthesis *…+ Fourth, and most im  
  portant, [it] configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articu-  
  lated with intelligent machines *…+ there are no essential differences or   
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  absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simula-  
  tion, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and   
  human goals. (2-3, my emphasis) 
Hayles’ goes on to provide an accessible history of the development of cybernetics throughout 
the 20th century, meanwhile considering how theories of information change our fundamental 
epistemological models and how AI and AL challenge essential human subjectivity. Clearly, 
Hayles has a much more specific conception of the posthuman than does Badmington, illustrat-
ing one in the variety of illuminations made possible by presuming the end of humanism and 
then imagining what that means. The posthuman theoretical project was still relatively nascent 
when both Hayles and Badmington made their first fundamental contributions to the field 
(1999 and 2000, respectively), and each have continued on separate but nonetheless related 
paths. While Badmington’s subsequent scholarship concerns alien (extraterrestrial) Others 
(Alien Chic, 2004), Hayles continues to investigate the relationship between humans and ma-
chines. In My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (2007), Hayles ad-
dresses her earlier work and updates the basis of her project. Recognizing the exponential rate 
of cybernetic advancement, she writes that “In the twenty-first century, the debates are likely 
to center not so much on the tension between the liberal humanist tradition and the posthu-
man but on different versions of the posthuman as they continue to evolve in conjunction with 
intelligent machines” (2, my emphasis). While some scholars continue to find Hayles’ conten-
tion of an assumed posthumanity overly presumptuous,12 I too cannot help but observe that 
humanism’s ideological frame seems empty and defunct in the face of science. Accuse me of 
                                                          
12 See Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (2010). 
30 
techno-elitism if you must, but personal and global technologies (even if only currently accessi-
ble to a certain demographic) are changing the world for everyone.  
Hayles speaks of what she calls the “Computational Universe,” a concept that “works 
simultaneously as means and metaphor in technical and artistic practices, producing and also 
produced by recursive loops that entangle with one another and with the diverse meanings of 
computation as technology, ontology, and cultural icon” (4, her emphasis). Hayles’ assertion 
that analysis can take place on both metaphorical and existential levels at the same time once 
again informs my own project here of using narrative symbols to decode the current cultural 
moment. Hayles engages in extensive literary analysis to build her argument, just as I will soon 
turn to televisual narrative to investigate the posthuman possibilities of human/machine hy-
bridity. Gordon Calleja picks up on the Haylesian strand of posthumanism by situating the 
emergence of the posthuman as a response to the fact that “The realm of humanity’s organic 
purity is under heavy theoretical fire by technological advancements in genetic engineering and 
nanotechnology, not to mention artificial intelligence and a number of theorists in philosophy 
of mind and neuropyschology that see the human mind as nothing more than a highly advanced 
machine” (6). Calleja uses the figure of the rhizome, “a system made up of linked points, with-
out a hierarchy or centre, forming a multiplicity with no beginning, center, or end” (7) as a 
means of conceptualizing the posthuman. By reigning in the implications of key discoveries in 
various scientific disciplines, Calleja offers a grounded representation of posthuman reality. Like 
Hayles, he asserts that the digitalization of information changes the way that culture and sub-
jectivity are conceived and that this paradigmatic shift announces posthumanity. “The posthu-
man,” Calleja concludes, “points to another layer in the history of homo sapiens which although 
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extending out of the previous layer of linear inscription, displaces it due to the emergent layers’ 
nonlinear nature” (13). This insistence on the disruption and subversion of linear historical 
models—as well as the relationship between nonlinearity and posthuman subjectivity—will be-
come especially important when analyzing both BSG and Dollhouse.  
While scholars of posthumanism do not hesitate to employ literary and film texts to en-
gage with their theoretical discourse, posthuman analyses of television shows are still quite 
rare. This oversight is likely due in part to lingering notions of television as a degraded mass 
media format that is less concerned with narrative quality and more concerned with advertising 
sales. As a burgeoning theoretical field, then, perhaps posthumanist scholars fear that bringing 
television into the equation could jeopardize the seriousness of the discipline. In fact, Manuela 
Rossini draws a distinct line between what she refers to as “popular posthumanism, which 
simply redresses the liberal-humanist mind/body split in postmodern chic and welcomes the 
turning of human beings into information patterns without bodies” and a “critical posthuman-
ism, which tries to avoid a dualistic approach to human ontology and emphasises the material 
instantiations and incorporations of information” (27-28, her emphasis).13 I argue that these 
two definitions are far from mutually exclusive, and furthermore, it is the overlap and interplay 
of popular representations and critical analyses that forms the most important aspect of post-
humanism. I would also venture to assert that the more popular the narrative, the more signifi-
cant its cultural impact. If posthuman scholarship is to infiltrate nonacademic platforms (which 
it should strive to do), popular narrative is the best way to forge that relationship. The inclusive 
discourse that results from linking critical theory to popular culture becomes a construction site 
                                                          
13 Seaman makes a similar distinction between “popular” and “theoretical” posthumanisms (247).  
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for posthuman ethics. So, I turn to BSG and Dollhouse in an attempt to describe a conception of 
posthuman television. 
 
Cylons, Humans, and Hybrids   
Media scholars and the relatively nascent field of “Television Studies” are certainly at-
tempting to rewrite the “boob tube”’s role in culture, as cable and broadcast networks contin-
ue to offer increasingly more complex and substantive narratives. Likewise, this thesis seeks to 
map the televisual posthuman onto two particularly intricate narratives, each of which invokes 
the Hegelian M/S dialectic; but rather than offering the traditional humanist endings of other 
robot rebellion narratives, these series subvert the binary opposition of human/nonhuman and 
sublate the dialectic by endorsing posthuman hybridity. The 2004 reboot of SF cult classic Bat-
tlestar Galactica (1978) illustrates a shifting thematic agenda within the SF genre, especially 
when considered in opposition to its precursor. In a recent roundtable discussion on the future 
of SF television, part of a conference organized by the media studies journal Flow TV, I posited 
that there is an evolution occurring within the genre that is comprised of four basic elements: 
mainstream appeal, generic hybridity, non-alien antagonists, and temporal immediacy.14 In re-
gards to the first two elements, which relate primarily to audience acquisition and popularity, 
the BSG reboot series shirks the anachronistic settings and costumes of the original in favor of a 
sleek and sexy aesethetic and relatively high budget special effects. Although it aired on a nar-
rowcast cable channel, Sci-Fi’s BSG enjoyed high ratings uncharacteristic of most SF series. The 
show’s broad appeal was also a result of its incorporation of elements from other genres such 
                                                          
14 My position paper for this roundtable is available for download at 
http://www.flowtv.org/conference/schedule.  
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as action/adventure and survival/thriller. In regards to the latter two thematic elements of 
“new” SF, the original Battlestar Galactica series takes place circa the year 7322, and the cylons 
are a malevolent alien race that builds robot soldiers. In the re-imagined series, the mechanical 
antagonists called cylons are instead products of their human creators, thus positioning the 
narrative as a story of robot rebellion. Furthermore, the series finale reveals that the narrative 
action, tacitly assumed throughout the series to be occurring in the future, actually takes place 
150,000 years in the past. This temporal revelation (which I will discuss at length later) high-
lights the relative and cyclical (read: nonlinear) nature of time and civilization and confirms the 
immediacy of the narrative. Overall, the changes that occurred within the narrative of this fran-
chise reflect a broader thematic transition in SF that can be seen in numerous contemporary 
series and that drives my interest in this evolving genre and the construction of what I perceive 
as posthuman television. 
BSG begins with the techno-apocalypse. In the first scene of the miniseries, explanatory 
on-screen text provides the basic narrative exposition: 
  The Cylons were created by man. They were created to make life easier   
  on the twelve colonies. And then the day came when the Cylons decided   
  to kill their masters. After a long and bloody struggle, an armistice was   
  declared. The Cylons left for another world to call their own…No one has   
  seen or heard from the Cylons in over forty years.  
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The knowledge of the First Cylon War as a failed attempt at the M/S confrontation thus frames 
the narrative in Hegelian terms.15 The miniseries goes on to depict a massive nuclear assault on 
the Twelve Colonies of humanity.16 This attack decimates the human population, and the survi-
vors band together into a small fleet of ships on the run from the cylons. The only remaining 
military vessel is the Galactica, which was only able to evade the cylon attack because of its 
outdated technology compared to the other ships in the Colonial Fleet. The ship’s captain, Wil-
liam Adama, is at the outset the ultimate humanist: he fought in the First Cylon War, he rejects 
technology in favor of instinct, and he instinctively hates his cylon enemy. Unfortunately for 
Captain Adama and the rest of the surviving humans, identifying the cylon enemy is quite a bit 
more complicated than it was 40 years earlier. Whereas the Centurian Cylon models (giant 
metal robots) that fought in the first rebellion were easily recognizable nonhuman Others, the 
Cylons who return to the Colonies at the beginning of the series are androids—“skinjobs”—and 
they “look and feel human” (intro titles).17 This revelation is particularly unsettling to the hu-
mans, as it complicates their previous understanding of artificial subjects.  
Throughout the series, the Cylon/human juxtaposition offers fruitful ground for explor-
ing the limits and possibilities of subjectivity, while the narrative structure demands a constant 
                                                          
15 The short-lived prequel series Caprica (2010-2011) takes place 58 years prior to BSG. The narrative 
chronicles the creation of the Cylon Centurians. In one key episode, Daniel Greystone, the scientist re-
sponsible for Cylon creation, pitches his invention to his company’s board of directors: “It’s a more than 
a machine. This Cylon will become a tireless worker who won’t need to be paid. It won’t retire or get 
sick. It won’t have rights, or objections, or complaints. It will do anything and everything we ask of it 
without question” (“There is Another Sky”). Note how this rhetoric resembles that of Domin’s in R.U.R.  
16 The Twelve Colonies consist of twelve neighboring planets, referred to as “colonies,” because their 
historical mythology recounts of a migration from their home planet, “Earth.” After the cylon attack on 
the colonies, Adama attempts to instill hope in the survivors by promising to lead them back to “Earth.”  
17 There are eight “skinjob” models, designated by numbers (“The Sixes,” “The Twos,” etc), and there are 
thousands of physically identical copies of each model. These humanoid cylons are effectively immortal, 
since their individual consciousness is simply downloaded into a new body after death—a process they 
refer to as “resurrection.”   
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ethical repositioning on the part of both characters and viewer. Meanwhile, the significant He-
gelian undertones of the extended battle for the survival of humanity in the wake of robot re-
bellion persist, seemingly endorsing a binary “Us versus Them” interpretation of the narrative. 
The humans clearly enjoyed a position of Mastery over their cylon Slaves, who rebelled once 
but failed to acquire subjectivity and fled without completing the battle for recognition. With 
the techno-apocalyptic rebellion that begins the miniseries, the cylons dethrone the humans as 
Masters. The surviving humans then become Slaves to the dominant power of the cylons, since 
all of the fleet’s actions are reactions to/dependent upon the cylons. Yet, despite their military 
subordination to the cylons, humans attempt to maintain a position of ontological superiority 
by refusing to recognize cylons as subjects, resulting in a complicated M/S entanglement. The 
initial narrative positioning of the show is then quite Hegelian, but the binary conception of 
good human and evil cylon that drives the early action of the show progressively crumbles, re-
vealing a broader definition of subjectivity by the end of the series and encouraging major ethi-
cal revisions concerning human relationships with technology. 
Initially, human sexual reproduction versus cylon resurrection serves as a crucial point of 
differentiation between the two groups, but it quickly becomes a vehicle for introducing the 
concept of hybridity as a means of escaping a cycle of violence and hatred towards the Other. 
When a female cylon (Athena) becomes impregnated by one of Galactica’s officers (Helo), she 
defects from her cylon duties and joins the ship’s crew. Their child Hera’s symbolic position as 
the first human/cylon hybrid complicates the person versus machine binary and eventually re-
veals the potential of posthumanity. At first, however, Captain Adama and the acting president 
of the Colonies, Laura Roslin, view Hera as a clear threat to humanity. In the season two epi-
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sode, “Epiphanies,” on the verge of dying from cancer, Roslin orders the abortion of Athena and 
Helo’s then-unborn child, blindly asserting its hybridity as a danger to the fleet and completely 
refusing to acknowledge its human status. As Adama corroborates, “If it’s good for the cylons, it 
must be bad for us.” In the same episode, however, scientist Balter discovers that the same ge-
netic mutations that sparked Roslin’s insistence on the abortion can actually save her life. In-
deed, an injection of Hera’s fetal blood cells eradicates Roslin’s cancer in a matter of hours, 
forcing the president to reconsider the value of the child. At this moment, Roslin, the leader of 
the human race, becomes a (however reluctant) cylon/human hybrid. Later, Roslin takes on a 
mothering role towards Hera (one shared by several characters) bound by a need to “protect 
the child” at all costs, without fully understanding why.  
Another important moment in the continuum of cylon representation across the narra-
tive comes in the season three episode “A Measure of Salvation,” when the opportunity to an-
nihilate the cylons with a mysterious virus sparks a heated debate amongst Adama, Roslin, Lee 
(Adama’s son), and Helo. When Helo suggests that this act would constitute genocide, Lee re-
sponds, “They’re not human. They were built, not born. No fathers, no mothers, no sons, no 
daughters.” Helo bluntly replies, “I had a daughter. I held her in my arms.”18 It is extremely tell-
ing that this late in the narrative, even after fighting at Athena’s side, Lee still cannot negotiate 
the cylons as persons—supposedly because of their alternative biology. I believe that behind 
Lee’s statement lies the real source of fear and hatred towards the cylons: their immortality 
through resurrection. As much as the cylons envy the human’s ability to “follow God’s com-
                                                          
18 At this point in the narrative, Helo and Athena believe that Hera is dead. After the child was born 
prematurely, Adama and Roslin decide to fake Hera’s death and give her to an adoptive mother until 
they can determine the child’s significance. 
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mandment of procreation” (“The Farm”), the humans surely also envy the cylons’ immortality, 
using it as a means of relegating them to mere machines and denying the possibility of individ-
ual consciousness. This ontological difference is the reason why it is not until the rebel cylons 
help the humans destroy the resurrection hub that integration becomes possible. This differ-
ence also explains why the two groups are at a Hegelian impasse: the cylons cannot risk their 
lives for recognition, because the act is meaningless if they will be automatically resurrected. 
The humans, therefore, cannot recognize the cylons as subjects.  
Perhaps the most important narrative moment in the shifting juxtaposition of human 
and cylon occurs at the end of season three, when four of the show’s most trusted characters 
(Chief Galen Tyrol, XO Saul Tigh, assistant to the president Tory Foster, and resistance fighter 
Sam Anders) discover that they are cylons and “have been from the start” (“Crossroads, Part 
Two”).19 The fear that has been propagated all along, that anyone could be a cylon, becomes 
painfully crystallized and forces the audience to realign their moral compasses. Confused and 
ashamed by their self-discovery, these characters decide to hide their true identities from the 
rest of the crew until they can understand the meaning of their cylon origins. This plot device 
produces several episodes rife with dramatic irony, as the viewer watches the four cylons at-
tempt to come to grips with their identities while guiltily interacting with their friends, lovers, 
and crewmembers. The Final Five revelation serves as a precursor to the drastic ontological re-
veal of the finale: the viewers sympathize with these major characters, so the knowledge of 
their true identities challenges the assumption of cylons as inherently evil in their Otherness.  
                                                          
19 These characters represent four of the members of the “Final Five,” a mysterious group of cylons that 
is referenced throughout the series. The origin of the Final Five and their significance to the narrative is 
not revealed until the fifth member, Ellen Tigh, returns to Galactica in season four.    
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In the pivotal episode “Guess What’s Coming to Dinner” (an allusion to the 1967 Sidney 
Poitier film dealing with interracial marriage), the question of the cylons as persons comes to 
the forefront when Natalie, the representative of a group of rebel cylons, attempts to form an 
alliance with Adama.20 Natalie offers to disclose the location of the cylon resurrection hub in 
exchange for access to the Final Five. She explains her motivation for this alliance to the quo-
rum of Colonial representatives: “Beyond the reach of the resurrection ships, something began 
to change. We could feel a sense of time […] We realized that for our existence to hold value, it 
must end. To live meaningful lives, we must die and not come back.” With this gesture, Natalie 
and her rebels are willing to exchange immortality (i.e. risk their lives) to obtain subjective rec-
ognition from the humans. The elimination of this essential difference serves as a crucial point 
in what eventually becomes a truce and partnership between the cylons and the humans. The 
emphasis on definitive mortality as necessary for true subjectivity also echoes Hayles’ assertion 
in How We Became Posthuman, “My dream is a version of the posthuman that embraces the 
possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power 
and disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human 
being” (5). While at first glance this attempt to confine the posthuman identity to the mortal 
coil might seem antithetical, inserting these kinds of limitations into the theoretical framework 
paves the way for an ethical adoption of posthumanity.  
                                                          
20 At this point, the humanoid cylons have broken into two factions: one that still sees the destruction of 
humanity as their priority (Ones, Fours, and Fives), the other “rebels” who feel that an alliance with hu-
mans is the only path to mutual survival of both species (Twos, Sixes, and Eights). Also at this point, the 
identity of the Final Five is still unknown to the fleet. 
39 
During a hostage standoff with a resurrected Diana21 in the episode “Revelations,” the 
fleet finally learns the identities of the members of the Final Five residing on Galactica. Al-
though Adama is at first unwilling to accept his best friend and commanding officer as a cylon, 
Lee’s truce with Diana and the subsequent discovery of the road to Earth convince him and 
most of the characters that the fates of cylons and humans are inextricably mixed. While the 
discovery of the 13th colony (“Earth”) as a radioactive wasteland disheartens both parties, it al-
so sheds light on the history of the cylons, as Galen, Saul, Sam, and Tory experience flashbacks 
of their former cylon lives while rummaging through the ruins. Ellen’s return to the group a few 
episodes later in “No Exit” answers a multitude of questions and gives hope for a new and hybr-
id direction for the fleet. Her explanation of the origin of the Final Five, in which we learn that 
cylons existed well before the establishment of the Twelve Colonies, complicates the represen-
tation of cylons as merely self-replicating machines, since Ellen informs us that the race of cy-
lons on Earth, the fabled “Thirteenth Tribe,” were capable of sexual reproduction and genetic 
differentiation. Ellen speaks of the eight skinjob models as her children, but also reveals that 
they were the Five’s reluctant gift of organic life to the Centurians in exchange for ending the 
First Cylon War in the colonies 40 years earlier. Upon learning the cyclical history of cylon crea-
tion, their relationship to humans and the positive potential of human/cylon hybridity becomes 
even more apparent.  
In the same episode, Ellen explains to Adama and Roslin why Cavil, the leader of the 
Ones, believes resurrection is a superior form of reproduction: “It’s too much for him. The 
thought that the only hope for the cylon people is this desperate grab for procreation, evolu-
                                                          
21 Diana is a Three model who had a vision of the Final Five.  
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tion, all that messy biological trial and error.” Ellen, on the other hand, firmly believes in Hera 
as “the hope for a new blended future.” While the cylons debate whether or not to remain with 
the fleet, Ellen corroborates Saul’s assertion that “Pure human doesn’t work. Pure cylon doesn’t 
work. It’s too weak,” and they all decide to remain on Galactica. Thus, humans and cylons final-
ly become a united group, searching for a new home while aligning against Cavil and the Four 
and Five models. Meanwhile, Galactica herself adopts a hybrid nature, as Galen oversees the 
infusion of a cylon glue-like substance to reinforce the ship’s infrastructure. Adama initially re-
fuses to endorse the procedure, but ultimately realizes that Galactica cannot survive without it. 
The Admiral half-heartedly laments of his ship and home, “She won’t know what she is any-
more,” an assessment that could also refer to human subjectivity. Galactica’s identity crisis in-
deed reflects the grander process of hybridization taking place in the fleet, as countless Twos, 
Sixes, and Eights integrate themselves as workers, pilots, and soldiers.  
Returning to Hera, as I have already suggested, her status as the first cylon/human hybr-
id encourages a highly symbolic interpretation of her character. Living her first year in relative 
anonymity with her adoptive mother, her custody then oscillates back and forth between the 
cylons and Galactica, but she only sparsely appears (in the flesh) onscreen.22 Despite her age of 
at least three years by season four, Hera remains almost completely pre-linguistic, allowing the 
preservation of her symbolic role in the formation of posthuman hybridity. Whereas Cavil sees 
her as merely “a half-human, half-machine object of curiousity,” Ellen insists that “Hera has 
some meaning that transcends the here and now” (“Daybreak”). The final battle of the narra-
                                                          
22 Hera’s most significant screen time occurs in a series of dream sequences, shared by Roslin, Athena, 
Caprica, and Hera. These visions enforce Hera’s significance, warn of the danger that surrounds her, and 
insist that the child must be protected.  
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tive becomes a rescue mission to attack Cavil and return Hera to her parents. Thus, humanity’s 
last battle is waged in the name of a human/cylon hybrid. This struggle culminates in an agree-
ment: Cavil will relinquish Hera and declare a ceasefire in exchange for the Final Five’s secret to 
resurrection. After transmitting most of the data to Cavil’s ship, Galen’s interruption of the 
transfer reignites the violence and forces Galactica to make a final emergency jump—to the 
coordinates that Hera unwittingly drew in a picture and that virtual Starbuck tried to deci-
pher.23 Their destination is Earth (as we know it), and the fleet then abandons their ships to set-
tle on the planet. Upon Lee’s suggestion, the survivors (both human and cylon) scatter across 
the continents, too weary to wage another attempt at rebuilding civilization. As Lee tells his fa-
ther, “Our science charges ahead, our souls lie behind.” The survivors thus choose to leave their 
technology behind and to live out their lives at peace with themselves and their loved ones. 
This might seem like the ultimate humanist conclusion, and if the narrative had ended there, it 
would have been.  
The revelation in the last few moments of the finale that these events have been taking 
place not in the distant future but 150,000 years in the past subverts any prior interpretation of 
the narrative. The show becomes a metacultural commentary, embodying its own creed (re-
peated cryptically throughout the series) that “All of this has happened before, and all of this 
will happen again.” From a Hegelian perspective, the temporal revelation at first suggests a cyc-
lical reading of history in which the players change, but the game remains the same; but when 
Hera is discovered as the mother of modern humanity, the “mitochondrial eve,” the show ends 
                                                          
23 Starbuck is one of the narrative’s central characters. After her apparent death, she returns in some 
kind of unidentified ontological form. I choose to refer to this incarnation of her character as “virtual 
Starbuck,” as I also refer to questionably corporeal forms of Caprica and Balter as “virtual.”   
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with its most strident appeal for an embracing of posthumanism. Hera’s significance finally be-
comes a reflexive commentary on our own inherently hybrid nature. As Julie Hawk writes, “This 
narrative device serves to catalyze an ontological shift in the viewer…Part of the effect of the 
narrative is the viewer’s unwitting but inevitable role in the end of the story as always already 
part cylon” (3). The dissolution of difference effected by this “ontological shift” echoes Hegel’s 
assertion that the goal of self-consciousness is to “supercede this otherness of itself[…] for this 
other is itself” (11). By projecting a half-cylon ancestry onto the contemporary human (i.e. the 
viewer), BSG succeeds in collapsing the Other into the Self, thus advocating the acceptance of a 
hybrid posthuman identity.   
The temporal and ontological revelations of the finale undermine the peaceful ending of 
the narrative proper and suggest that human civilization as we experience it is merely conform-
ing to a prescribed pattern. In the final moments of the series, as virtual Balter and virtual Ca-
prica walk the streets of modern day New York City, with evidence of current technological 
progress saturating the scenery, the real question (and the ultimate challenge) of the narrative 
becomes, does this have to happen again? BSG thus posits a potential exit strategy from the 
M/S dialectic by revealing the false constructiveness of the human/nonhuman, subject/object 
ontological division and the skewed ethics that arise out of those juxtapositions. In this post-
human turn, “*T+he binary extremes are both rejected in favor of a third space, a space where 
revisions might be made” (Hawk 13). The posthuman revision made possible through a rejec-
tion of ontological binaries points towards an ethical negotiation of technology and a broa-
dened definition of ontology. The final shot of the finale zooms into a television set displaying a 
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small dancing robot whose shape resembles the cylon Centurians.24 This shot leads into the 
closing credits, which roll alongside a montage of clips featuring various forms of artificial sub-
jects, boldly confronting the viewer with cybernetic reality and urging a critical evaluation of 
our relationship to technology. As for the residual human quest for dominance and Mastery 
that seems to threaten the ethical fabric of every attempt at civilization, we can find hope in 
virtual Caprica’s parting assertion to the viewer: “Let a complex system repeat itself long 
enough, eventually something surprising might happen.” By referring to civilization as a “com-
plex system,” this statement demands an objective interpretation of history, evolution, and on-
tology. Like Calleja’s rhizomatic description of posthuman identity, BSG’s narrative structure 
and content suggest that civilization is a nonlinear rhizome with the inherent potential to reor-
ganize itself in nonhierarchical terms.  The posthuman ethics that emerge from BSG are there-
fore not only concerned with dramatic ontological revisions, but also with sociocultural sustai-
nability. If our current civilization’s existence on this planet is indeed a complex system that 
evolves according to the interactions of its various components, then a paradigmatic transfor-
mation of our ethical framework contains the potential to change the system itself. Dollhouse 
takes up a variety of the most pressing ethical questions posed by recent technological discove-
ries, while continuing to highlight personal ontological struggle as a key aspect of posthumani-
ty. Although a short-lived series, Dollhouse achieves the significant narrative and thematic 
complexity that exemplifies my conception of posthuman television and aids in the construc-
tion of a posthuman ethical discourse.  
 
                                                          
24 The featured robot is ASIMO, a robot created by Honda in 2000.  
44 
The Rossum Corporation 
Spawned from cult-favorite television showrunner Joss Whedon, Dollhouse may not 
have produced the ratings expected of a prime time broadcast series, but the ample critical at-
tention it has garnered recently is evidence of its prowess as a unique and intriguing experi-
ment in SF television narrative. The two twelve-episode seasons, each capped off with an “Epi-
taph,” have generated numerous online discussion forums, an installment in the Smart Pop 
book series, and a special issue in Slayage, the online Whedon studies journal. The show’s bold 
engagement with contemporary neuroscience and ethics provides fertile ground for explora-
tions of the moral, psychological, and ontological implications of the story. Dollhouse is primari-
ly about the de(con)struction of identity, specifically the humanistic, Cartesian model of 
mind/body dualism and the pseudo-secular concept of the soul.25 By depicting a world identical 
to our own (save a few particular technological advancements), the narrative engages directly 
with contemporary ethical issues.26 In secret facilities in major cities throughout the world, a 
corrupt megacorporation operates “dollhouses” that serve the whims of the extremely wealthy 
and powerful. The scientists behind the dollhouses have acquired the technology to build, dis-
tort, transfer, and erase personalities from human subjects in a matter of minutes. The dolls are 
“volunteers”27 who sign well-paid five year contracts to shelve their own personalities on a hard 
drive. Clients willing to pay an exorbitant fee then rent the dolls, who are imprinted with made-
                                                          
25 I would venture to assert that as neuroscience reveals the underlying processes of human behavior, it 
subsequently renders the idea of a soul—and the theological morality associated with it—more or less 
extant. 
26 To name a few examples: bioenhancements, invasive brain scanning, psychopharmacology, mind con-
trol, memory manipulation.  
27 Viewers eventually learn that most of the dolls are recruited based on various life situations that 
might make them amenable to taking a five-year hiatus from their consciousness: PTSD, loss of a child, 
psychosis, etc.  
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to-order personalities and participate in specially-designed “engagements.” When the dolls are 
not actively engaged, they remain in the dollhouse, their brains in a child-like tabula rasa state. 
The show focuses on the story of the Los Angeles dollhouse and its inhabitants, and it is set in 
the present day. 
Dollhouse contains both direct allusions to Čapek and indirect resonances of the Hege-
lian M/S dialectic, making the show an ideal text to bring my earlier discussion of R.U.R. full cir-
cle. The megacorporation that funds the dollhouses and serves as the narrative’s primary anta-
gonist is entitled the Rossum Corporation. Rossum co-founder Clyde explains the origin of the 
company’s name to the show’s protagonist Echo, “It’s from a play. You’re not technically ro-
bots, but it seemed to fit” (“Getting Closer”). Indeed, there are other contemporary SF narra-
tives that address artificial subjectivity in more traditional robotic terms, but Dollhouse’s 
nuanced approach to subjectivity and its emphasis on the relationship between technological 
advancements and post-industrial corporate capitalism primes the narrative for an incorpora-
tion of my posthuman argument into the topical realm of ethics. My previous scholarship on 
this show has emphasized the intricate temporal structure of the series as a way of identifying a 
posthuman narratology.28 Here, I will use some of my previous narrative analysis to examine 
the thematic components that evoke and eventually sublate the M/S and self/other distinc-
tions.  
The show’s first season consists of mostly self-contained episodes chronicling the dolls’ 
engagements, particularly those of protagonist Echo. Echo reacts differently to the imprints 
than do the other dolls, and her process of subjectivization is indeed one of the key themes of 
                                                          
28 “Making Sense of the Future: Narrative Destabilization in Joss Whedon’s Dollhouse.” Television and 
Temporality: Exploring Narrative Time in 21st- Century Programming. U of Mississippi P, forthcoming. 
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the narrative.29 I am, however, less interested in Echo specifically than I am in the dolls collec-
tively and the ultimate repercussions of the imprint technology. The dolls are clearly positioned 
as Slaves to their human Masters (Rossum employees), and they also engage in rebellion on 
both small-scale levels (the characters we know in the series) and on a large-scale in the narra-
tive’s techno-apocalyptic counterparts (i.e. the “Epitaph” episodes). When Whedon saw Doll-
house likely facing cancellation at the end of the first season, he commissioned his brother Jed 
and sister-in-law Maurissa Tancharoen to write the teleplay of the story that would become 
“Epitaph One,” a post-apocalyptic narrative that jumps forward ten years from the action of the 
first season. This ten-year gap mirrors the temporal shift from the Prologue to Act One in 
R.U.R., and the difference between the two worlds is equally stark. In season one, the Rossum 
Corporation and its technology claim to offer personal fulfillment for the individual and scientif-
ic progress for the community,30 but the certainty of a vague and darker purpose underlies the 
entire narrative. The techno-apocalyptic potential of the imprint technology is first addressed in 
the sixth episode, “Man On the Street,” which uses documentary-style interstitials to present 
an ethical discourse about the dollhouse from the perspective of various “average Angelinos.” 
In the DVD commentary for this episode, J. Whedon reveals that he considered this episode the 
true series pilot, because it demonstrated that Dollhouse is “about difference of opinion. It’s 
about the things we believe, how we come to believe them, and how we are forced to believe 
them.” The structure of this episode, coupled with Whedon’s commentary, emphasizes public 
                                                          
29 See several essays from Inside Joss’ Dollhouse, especially Julie Hawk’s contribution: “More Than the 
Sum of Our Imprints.”  
30 The dollhouse is Rossum’s under-the-radar operation, but the corporation is also portrayed as the 
world’s leader in various fields of research related to global betterment.  
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response as an integral component in forging an ethical discourse concerning technology in so-
ciety.  
“Epitaph One” reveals the ultimate repercussions of the imprint technology—large-scale 
biological weapons sold to the highest bidder. The result is the technoapocalypse: as Topher 
Brink, the dollhouse's top techno-scientist describes, “One robo-call to a city... And an entire 
army in a single instant in the hands of any government... Millions programmed to kill anyone 
who is not programmed to kill.” While the potential for such a disaster was first mentioned in 
the episode discussed above, it is safe to assume that Whedon would likely have prolonged the 
bleak revelation across many seasons had he enjoyed a different production/network situation. 
Instead, believing the thirteenth episode to be the last of the series, Whedon ventured to ex-
pose the ultimate telos of the story while he still had the chance. “Epitaph One” does not depict 
the apocalyptic moment explicitly, instead beginning in media res, with humanity on its last 
proverbial leg. In recognizing the inevitably dangerous path that the morally bankrupt, capital-
ist-driven scientific community is currently following, Dollhouse makes a strident appeal for an 
ethical negotiation of technological potential as a necessary step in protecting humanity from a 
self-inflicted downfall. 
In “Epitaph One,” a band of survivors—called “Actuals” because they retain their origi-
nal personalities—evades hoards of “Butchers,” one of the two subjective results of the mass-
imprinting event.31 The appellation of Actuals thus presumes an incomplete subjectivity for all 
non-Actuals, therefore enforcing a binary ontological opposition even in the wake of the tech-
no-apocalypse. The group of survivors stumbles upon the LA dollhouse and uses the imprinting 
                                                          
31 “Butchers” are hyper-violent, cannibalistic subjects. “Dumbshows,” the other subjective result of the 
mass-imprinting event, resemble the dolls in their tabula rasa state. 
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chair to access memories that help explain the cause of the techno-apocalypse. One key revela-
tion of these flashbacks concerns the mental disintegration of Topher Brink. Dollhouse clearly 
wants to emphasize the role of unmediated scientific curiosity in bringing about the techno-
apocalypse, and Topher’s character serves as an apt vessel for conveying the ethically skewed 
mindset of the corporate science world. The Rossum Corporation groomed him as a genius, in-
stilling and encouraging his belief that he is above all ethical restriction. Therefore, while the 
Rossum executives are surely the most obvious Hegelian Masters of the story, Topher pos-
sesses the power of scientific genius: he controls the fate of the dolls, so he is thus their true 
Master. Therefore, when “Epitaph One” reveals that Topher’s guilt over his role in the techno-
apocalypse has crippled his sanity, the narrative suggests that the Master has been dethroned, 
and the slaves—Butchers and Dumbshows though they are—rule the post-apocalyptic wastel-
and.  
In another notable flashback, Adelle, the manager of the LA Dollhouse, argues with Mr. 
Ambrose, a Rossum executive who has downloaded his personality into one of the Dolls in or-
der to update Adelle on the new company policy of offering permanent imprinting. When she 
expresses ethical concerns about these “complete anatomy upgrades,” he explains,  
“We’ve always been above the law *…+ only now we are writing it. This will all be legal within a 
year *…+ This is the time to choose, Adele, whether you want to be someone who lives on 
through the endless epic arc of history, or a quickly  discarded, decomposing vessel enriching 
the soil.” Ambrose’s statement embodies the potential posthuman impulse towards immortali-
ty that defies ethics and accountability. He endorses the permanent usurpation of the bodies of 
the “volunteers,” presumably motivated only by the desire to accumulate more wealth and 
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power. Ambrose’s disturbing logic evokes the suggestion Daniel Dinello makes in his science 
fiction study Technophobia: “Tortured by the absolute certainty of suffering, growing old, and 
dying, the mostly white, affluent, male prophets of perfectibility put their faith in technology to 
save humanity by transubstantiating the organic body” (19). Dinello’s insistence on white male 
affluence as a prominent trait in the posthuman impulse for power certainly holds true in Am-
brose’s case, and indeed with most of the clients and proponents of the dollhouse. Adelle, 
however, naively clings to the notion that the dollhouse truly helps people by allowing them to 
experience their deepest desires; it is not until this moment that she understands that the cor-
poration’s purpose has been much darker all along. Ambrose, the emblem of super-capitalist 
enterprise, seeks money, political control, and global power, and is willing to compromise all 
concepts of ethics to obtain a kind of superhuman status. He tells Adelle, “Imagine what one 
man can achieve if he has no fear and will live forever?” Ambrose’s focus on immortality 
represents the kind of megalomaniacal posthumanism against which Hayles warns in her 
work.32 The narrative places Ambrose’s perverse conception of posthuman vision in stark con-
trast with the more ethically-minded Adelle in order to comment on the necessity of a moral 
compass as we navigate an increasingly technological society. Dollhouse recognizes that with 
the advent of new forms and applications of technology, new ethical questions perpetually 
emerge that require a variety of posthuman considerations.  
After a chain of events reduces the group of survivors to only two, the remaining cha-
racters deduce that they can imprint the body of a traitor with Echo’s personality. She knows 
how to get to a place called “Safe Haven,” where people have figured out how to resist the re-
                                                          
32 This scene also serves as a foil to the moment in BSG when the rebel cylons willingly surrender immor-
tality for a chance at recognition.  
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mote imprinting and where “you die as you were born, heart in concert with the mind.” This 
notion is certainly an oversimplified, idealized humanist impulse, made sympathetic in light of 
the apocalyptic destruction of subjective unity; but in a bitterly ironic scene, the Echo imprint 
looks at a picture of her former body and remarks, “I hope we find me alive.” “Epitaph One” 
thus appears to end with a message of humanist striving for reunification of mind and body, but 
the fact that a posthuman imprint will lead the survivors to Safe Haven complicates this mes-
sage, thus departing from the typical SF humanist conclusion but still falling short of an explicit 
posthuman message.   
In a surprising decision by the FOX network, Dollhouse received a second season and the 
chance to delve deeper into the ontological issues raised in season one. “Vows,” the first epi-
sode of season two, capitalizes immediately on the plethora of knowledge revealed in “Epitaph 
One,” beginning a season-long metadiegetic33 inside joke amongst writers and viewers of the 
show. The narrative returns temporally to the “present” moment, but incorporates actual 
scenes from the “Epitaph One” flashbacks and introduces new plotlines that are directly in-
formed by knowledge of future events. In “Vows,” one of the dolls torments Topher and ques-
tions his control over the technology, and he replies, “I know what I know.” This line is a direct 
quote from the mentally disintegrated Topher of the future, so its (p)reiteration at this moment 
is particularly emotionally haunting for the viewer. From the beginning of season two, then, the 
writers are committed to directly confronting the diegetic gaps created by “Epitaph One.” As 
the season progresses, the writers reveal several ethical turning points for Topher, thus filling in 
                                                          
33 In my analysis of season two of Dollhouse, I use “diegetic” to refer to the events unfolding in the cen-
tral narrative, and “metadeigetic” to refer to the additional narrative layer that results from the viewer’s 
knowledge of “Epitaph One.”  
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the explanation behind his eventual insanity, although without ever completely closing the 
temporal disparity. In the third episode of season two, “Belle Chose,” Topher attempts to per-
form a remote brain wipe for the first time. This event seems minor, or at least not out of the 
ordinary, when considered only within the diegesis. The viewer’s knowledge of “Epitaph One,” 
however, indicates the extreme significance of this moment in terms of the eventual weaponi-
zation of the imprint technology and Topher’s direct role in its creation. While brainstorming 
possible methods of wiping a missing active doll, Topher ponders, “Victor would need to have a 
phone, I’d need to have a tone, I’d have to get him to answer the phone….Do you have his 
number?” This scene evokes the earlier (but later) scene from “Epitaph One,” when an insane 
Topher reflects back on the catalyst of the technoapocalypse – a robotic phone call. Moments 
like these throughout the second season function to remind the viewer of their own knowledge 
of the future, forcing them to recall and reimagine the content of “Epitaph One.” If, as Bruce 
Clarke observes, “In both the narrative and systemic instances, one discerns interpenetration, a 
double-feedback loop” (31), then Dollhouse’s narrative structure informs its posthuman onto-
logical project of encouraging a hybridized subjectivity. Just as BSG demanded a constant ethi-
cal repositioning on the part of the viewer, Dollhouse season two uses “Epitaph One” to create 
a metadiegesis that challenges the possibility of any stable ethical positions throughout the 
narrative. 
In “The Attic,” the spatio-temporal world of “Epitaph One” collides with the story of the 
dollhouse in 2009 and creates a somewhat tragic metadiegetic moment. In this episode, Echo 
enters a digitally-constructed dream world where prisoners of the Rossum Corporation are 
forced to endure their worst nightmare perpetually (meanwhile, their bodies are linked up to a 
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giant computer mainframe that harnesses their brain power). The Attic is thus a virtual grid of 
narrative loops, a visual manifestation of systems theory approach to storytelling and to human 
experience. While most of the prisoners are unaware of their state in the virtual realm, some, 
like Echo, are able to become aware and escape their loops (i.e. you can only escape the story 
by realizing that you are a character in it). This might also be a useful metaphor for extricating 
ourselves from Hegel’s sociocultural narrative of the M/S dialectic. As Echo navigates her fellow 
prisoners’ nightmares, she eventually meets Rossum Corporation co-founder Clyde, who was 
betrayed by his partner and trapped in the Attic. Upon entering Clyde’s consciousness, Echo is 
met with a chaotic post-apocalyptic landscape identical in aesthetic to the setting of “Epitaph 
One.” Viewers learn that Clyde’s nightmare loop was performing statistical analysis on the 
eventual results of the brain imprinting technology, and that all but 3% of his scenarios include 
the “end of civilization,” the depiction of which is projected in the post-apocalyptic setting of 
his nightmare world. Since viewers know that Clyde’s prediction is absolutely true, Echo’s insis-
tence on her ability to prevent the apocalypse produces a moment of stark dramatic irony for 
the viewer. In “Dollhouse’s Future History Machines,” Kirsten Strayer notes, “While our heroes 
strove to prevent Clyde’s prophecy from coming to pass, we knew that it was the inevitable fu-
ture” (181). By reminding the viewer of the inescapability of Dollhouse’s techno-apocalyptic te-
los, this episode sets up the final two installments of the narrative proper as ultimately ironic. 
Indeed, the triumphant image of Echo blowing up Rossum’s headquarters in “The Hollow Men” 
is immediately counteracted by a brief flash to the post-apocalyptic future, with the protagon-
ists gunning down imprinted Butchers. The writers make no attempt to close the temporal gap 
between the impending techno-apocalypse and the events of season two, leaving myriad ques-
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tions unanswered and many aspects of the narrative timeline unclear. This lack of diegetic reso-
lution promotes a posthuman reading by rejecting linearity and leaving the narrative open to 
multiple interpretations.    
In the final episode of the series, the narrative jumps back (and forward) to the post-
apocalyptic diegesis with “Epitaph Two: Return.” Picking up where “Epitaph One” left off, this 
episode gave the Dollhouse creators the opportunity to conclude the narrative with some sort 
of finality. “Epitaph Two: Return” is a techno-apocalyptic redemption story. In his mentally dis-
integrated state, Topher devises a way to “bring back the world” by reversing the effects of the 
mass imprinting and restoring everyone’s original personalities. Unfortunately, the device 
needed to accomplish this task is a massive explosive, and it can only be activated manually. So, 
Topher performs the ultimate act of self-sacrifice in order to make amends for his involvement 
in precipitating the techno-apocalyptic disaster. He risks his life for subjective redemption ra-
ther than recognition: his act makes new subjectivities external to himself possible, thus rewrit-
ing the telos of the Hegelian M/S dialectic struggle. The show then ends in a remarkably post-
human fashion: Topher’s device restores personalities to their rightful owners, but civilization is 
still in shambles. The survivors have lost years of their lives with no memory of the things that 
they have done (or the people they have killed). The redemption narrative is therefore only 
questionably redeeming: the elements are there (death of main characters, self-sacrifice, hope-
ful music), but a nagging feeling of loss persists in the final moments of the series. It is safe to 
assume that the restoration of one’s mind/body cohesion is a little less relieving when you 
wake up years later alone in a pile of rubble or munching on human flesh. In other words, “Epi-
taph Two” and therefore Dollhouse as a whole refuses a tidy humanist conclusion. In the end of 
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the narrative, humanity prevails, but emerges permanently altered, disoriented, and disorga-
nized. Other than the handful of Actuals that managed to survive in the techno-apocalyptic 
wasteland, every person now must come to terms with the fact that their minds have been ma-
nipulated and they have lost years of their lives. In portraying a human subject that is decidedly 
changed, broken, but still redemptive, Dollhouse asks us to embrace a posthuman identity as a 
means of coping with a drastically different world. Furthermore, the remarkably positive post-
human evolution represented by Echo offers an exciting portrayal of the possibilities of a total 
acceptance and cultivation of the posthuman self. “Epitaph Two: Return” finally confronts the 
viewer with the message that humankind may prevail – but only after devastating hardship – 
and it will be permanently altered, dejected, and destabilized. 
 
Conclusion: Practical Posthumanism 
After the destruction of the cylon resurrection hub in BSG, one of the Eights remarks of 
her newly acquired mortality: “It’s a good thing, because now there’s no difference. We can all 
start trusting each other” (“The Hub”). The Eight’s logical connection between the dissolution of 
difference and egalitarian social interaction exemplifies my posthuman ethical argument. Earli-
er in this chapter, I suggested that a combination of “popular” and “critical” posthumanisms 
(Rossini) is necessary in order to address the full range of the theory’s implications. I would now 
like to offer the term practical posthumanism to designate this attempt at negotiating a theo-
retical onto-epistemological discourse with a topical ethical conversation. The motivation be-
hind the posthuman inquiry is inextricably tied to contemporary issues of cybernetics, neuros-
cience, genome-mapping, biotechnology, etc. In other words, its concerns are immediate, 
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pressing, and essential to the future of technology in society. As science continues to debunk 
the mysteries of the universe, secular humanist ethics that position “Man” as Master are no 
longer relevant. My conception of practical posthumanism is therefore primarily concerned 
with the type of ethical revision that becomes necessary with the advent of artificial subjectivity 
and other destabilizing forms of technology. Ideally, practical posthumanism will bridge discur-
sive divides and disciplinary boundaries in order to fully address contemporary ethics in a varie-
ty of contexts.  
The ontological core of the posthuman theoretical project is precisely why I chose to 
begin this thesis with the work of Hegel: by invoking one of the primary figures of the Western 
philosophical tradition and demonstrating the posthuman underpinnings of his work, I suggest 
that posthumanism is an inevitable and necessary progression of humanism. Posthumanism in 
practical application should not ignore the positive elements of its predecessor, but instead 
transform humanism’s anthropocentric onto-epistemological paradigm so that it might function 
in a postindustrial, postsecular, postmodern world. In chapter one, I used Hegel’s narrativiza-
tion of the M/S dialectic as a tool for analyzing subjective relations in the fictional context of 
robot rebellion. The M/S dialectic’s ideal telos as sublation of Otherness anticipates posthuman 
ontology in its resistance to dichotomies.  Furthermore, the posthuman emphasis on “muta-
tion, variation, becoming” (Seaman 246) echoes Hegel’s conception of “life as process” (107, my 
emphasis). The most fundamental link between Hegelianism and posthumanism is then the pri-
vileging of motion—both in the development of consciousness and historical perception. One of 
the underlying concepts of this thesis has been to chart a kind of historical progression in both 
the narrative and theoretical realms. Therefore, my analysis of R.U.R. as a significant cultural 
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text that informs contemporary SF simultaneously provides a teleological model against which 
posthuman narratives can distinguish themselves as ontologically progressive.  
In the epilogue of My Mother Was a Computer, Hayles writes of popular narrative depic-
tions of artificial subjects, “However this power struggle is played out and whatever its out-
come, the subject/object dichotomy remains intact, as does the implication that subjects have 
the right to dominate objects” (242-243). Here, Hayles describes the residual humanism that I 
have critiqued throughout this thesis. She goes on to warn that “*i+f we interpret the relations 
of humans and intelligent machines only within this paradigm, the underlying structures of do-
mination and control continue to dictate the terms of engagement” (243). While Hayles turns 
to literature in order to seek out texts that undermine “the subject/object divide,” she seems to 
dismiss (or at least ignore) the potential significance of popular cultural narratives altogether. 
She goes on to assert that “an essential component of coming to terms with the ethical implica-
tions of intelligent machines is recognizing the mutuality of our interactions with them, the 
complex dynamics through which they create us even as we create them” (243). As I demon-
strated in this second chapter, popular televisual narratives like BSG and Dollhouse demon-
strate this symbiotic relationship between humans and technology and encourage viewers to 
think about the connection between posthuman ontology and contemporary ethics. I referred 
to these series as examples of “posthuman television,” and indeed I see the current trends 
within the SF genre gravitating towards these kinds of complex and challenging narratives that 
destabilize identity, problematize humanist ethics, and undermine essentialist interpretations 
of subjectivity. A critical engagement with these popular narratives as responses to the post-
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human condition will provide a bridge between two complementary discourses and pave the 
way for practical applications of posthuman theory.  
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